Foreign bank presence has substantially increased in Latin America during the second half of the 1990s, which has prompted an intense debate on its banking and macroeconomic consequences. Discussions involved topics such as the efficiency and diversification of the banking industry, the quality of the regulatory environment, and competition and access to banking services by small and medium size enterprises, among a broader set of topics studied by the literature. In this paper, we apply ARCH techniques to jointly estimate the impact of foreign bank presence on the level and volatility of real credit in a panel of eight Latin American countries using quarterly data over the period 1995:1-2001:4. Results show that, together with financial development, foreign bank presence has contributed to reduce real credit volatility.
Introduction
Foreign bank entry into developing countries has exploded since the 1990s, a trend that had been dominated in the previous decade by cross-border lending activities. International banking institutions have been expanding their presence in several emerging market economies by establishing foreign branches and subsidiaries, favoured by the opening up of their foreign sectors and the embracement of a series of market-friendly policy reforms, including deregulation and privatization of the banking sector. Two regions that have been very active in attracting foreign direct investment into the banking industry have been Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. In the Middle East and North Africa, foreign bank presence has increased at a generally slower pace, while it remained stagnant or even declined in South and East Asia and the Pacific (Figure 1 ).
This unprecedented internationalisation of the banking sector has prompted a debate on the potential consequences for the recipient countries. Multinational banks are likely to introduce better practices, and improved management and information technologies, helping boosting the efficiency and diversification of banking services in host countries (Levine, 1997; Goldberg, 2007) . They are also thought to have the potential to ameliorate emerging countries' banking regulation and supervision (Goldberg, 2007) . Moreover, they may lead to greater competition in markets that had been captured by domestic institutions, which should reduce banking costs and increase the overall efficiency of the system (Berger and Hannan, 1989; Hannan, 1991; Claessens et al., 2001; Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002; Evanoff et al., 2002; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2003) . However, foreign banks may limit lending to small and medium sized enterprises (Berger et al., 2001) , by attracting mainly the wealthier customers and leaving the riskiest borrowers to local banks, then weakening domestic banks (Claessens et al., 2000; Barajas et al., 2000) .
Against this background, the present paper investigates the impact of foreign bank presence on real credit volatility in a panel of eight Latin American countries during the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . The literature on the internationalisation of the banking sector and the implications for banking and macroeconomic stability is rather limited and does not give a clear answer to this issue. There are those who argue that foreign banks are more likely to be fickle lenders, since they have better access to alternative business opportunities than domestic banks (Galindo et al., 2005) . Moreover, they could potentially import shocks from their home countries, then contributing to destabilising domestic banking systems (Goldberg, 2002; Martinez Peria et al., 2005) . However, foreign banks may increase the buffer shock function of the banking sector in case of negative shocks because they are typically well diversified institutions with access to a broader set of liquidity sources de Haas and van Lelyveld, 2006) . Multinational banks may also allow for a faster recapitalisation of local banks after a crisis, as was the case following the Mexican, Brazilian and Argentinean banking crisis of the 1990s (Peek and Rosengren, 2000) . Finally, due to superior risk management systems, better screening devices and home country supervision, foreign banks are likely to hold higher quality assets (Crystal, Dages and Goldberg, 2001) , and have the potential to avoid capital flight in case of domestic shocks (de Haas, 2002; Peek and Rosengreen, 2000) .
We deviate from the previous empirical literature in that we apply ARCH techniques to model jointly the first and second conditional moments of real domestic credit. In order to shed light on the issue of credit volatility, the ARCH equation is extended to include the degree of development of the banking sector and the internationalization of the banking system among the regressors. To the knowledge of the authors, this is the first time that such tools are used to analyse the impact of foreign bank presence on macroeconomic volatility.
Most of the applied studies on foreign banks and stability over different macroeconomic aggregates were grounded on econometric models which analyse only the first conditional moment of the dependent variable . And the only study that has tried to account for the second conditional moment of the data has done so using two-step methods, which are known to be inefficient (Morgan and Strahan, 2003) .
The main findings of the paper regarding credit volatility are as follows: i) Perhaps not surprisingly, banking crisis steeped-up real credit volatility, with public and foreign banks having no discernible effect (positive or negative) during these stressful periods; ii) evidence reported in this paper shows that deeper banking systems result in lower credit volatility, a finding that is coherent with Denizer et al. (2001) for other macroeconomic variables, such as consumption, investment and real GDP; iii) Stabilising affects predominate in a such a way that foreign bank presence reduced credit volatility in our panel of eight Latin American countries over the period 1995-2001. The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of theoretical considerations underling the link between foreign direct investment in the banking sector and macroeconomics volatility. Section III details the data construction process and Section IV presents the ARCH econometric model used in the estimations. Panel unit root test are exposed in Section V, while Section VI describes the estimation results. Section VII concludes. 
Foreign banks and volatility: A review of the literature
The theoretical literature examining the link between foreign direct investment in the banking sector and macroeconomic stability is rather limited. To the knowledge of the authors, only two studies deal with such an issue: Morgan et al. (2004) , who design a banking model with capital-constrained intermediaries, and Galindo et al. (2005) , who use a portfolio model. In both cases, foreign bank presence has contradictory effects on volatility, depending on the type of shock hitting the economy. Morgan et al. (2004) (MSR) extended to two countries the banking model originally developed by Holmstrom and Tirol (1997) (HT) for the case a closed economy. In the HT model, firms have to choose between two sources of financing: bank or investors capital, which are not perfectly substitutable. Bank capital is the most expensive, because banks provide not only loans but also valuable monitoring services. Banks monitor the investment projects that are managed by firms but are financed by part of the firms in the economy, the banks and the investors. For this reason, bank capital is called "informed capital", while investor capital (not subject to monitoring) is called "uninformed capital". Capital-constrained banking intermediaries are cardinal in this set up, since some firms depend on bank lending for investment. Indeed, the banking system may become a main source of instability in the economy, since any shock on banks will have immediate real effects on economic activity.
MSR's extension of the HT model allows studying how bank capital shocks (financial shocks) and firm capital shocks (real or collateral shocks) affect the distribution of bank capital between countries, under an internationally integrated banking system. The twocountry version of the model is completed by adding another physical country, and letting a fixed amount of international bank capital to freely move across borders, while the amount of firm capital in each individual country is fixed and subject to external shocks. Uninformed investors in both countries have access to a worldwide securities market with a quasiunlimited supply of investment opportunities (the securities market rate of return is exogenous, equal in both countries and independent of country-specific shocks).
To isolate the effect of banking integration on economic volatility, MSR compare the impact of bank and firm capital shocks over credit and investment, both under a multinational and a national banking system. Indeed, suppose there is a negative bank capital shock in one of the countries. The impact on the amount of uninformed and informed capital invested in the affected country is smaller when the banking system is internationally integrated. Bank (informed) capital declines less in an integrated system because after a negative bank capital shock, the rate of return on this type of capital increases. This attracts bank capital from the unaffected country then buffering the negative initial effect. In turn, the smaller reduction in informed capital also induces a smaller contraction in investor (uninformed) capital. Given that banks monitor firms, bank capital constitutes a signal that firms exploit in order to attract investor capital. Consequently, in the case of a negative bank capital shock, a multinational banking system helps promoting the stability of total credit and investment in the economy.
In contrast to the previous case, the negative impact of a firm collateral shock is amplified under a multinational system. As before, two mechanisms are at play. First, the lower value of firm collateral decreases the bank capital rate of return after a negative shock in an integrated banking system. Therefore, banks will prefer lending their mobile capital in the unaffected country, where the bank capital rate of return is higher and firms are backed by better collateral. As a consequence, bank capital is reduced in comparison with a national system, because in this case bank capital is immobile. In turn, negative firm capital shocks end in larger declines of investor capital in an integrated banking system. As before, the supply of uninformed capital depends on the firms' ability to leverage bank capital, which is directly linked to the firm collateral. Indeed, the negative collateral shock that reduces bank capital makes it more difficult for them to attract uninformed capital. Therefore, bank credit and investment suffer more in a multinational banking system when negative firm collateral shocks hit the economy. Galindo et al. (2005) (GMP) extend Pyle's (1971) portfolio model to many countries, which allows them to examine the behaviour of well diversified banks across nations in case of shocks to the host country. In their theoretical model, banks in each country have deposits and assets. They show that credit from well diversified foreign banks will be more stable when liquidity shocks (i.e., shocks to funding costs) hit the economy. In fact, multinational banks have access to a global pool of liquidity, so they may be less sensitive to a rise in deposit interest rates than domestic banks. In contrast, foreign banks may react more aggressively in the case of opportunity shocks (i.e., shocks to expected returns), worsening the impact of globalization on banking stability in the host country. A worldwide diversified bank is able to rapidly withdraw investments from a host country when there is a decline in expected returns, reassigning the capital to that part of the world with better economic prospects.
All in all, from the theoretical literature, it seems clear that the final effect of foreign financial institutions on macroeconomic volatility depends on the type of shocks hitting the economy. In the MSR model, banking integration reduces credit and investment volatility under bank capital shocks, but it increases it under firm collateral shocks. In the GMP model, foreign banks may bring rewards in terms of greater stability with respect to shocks that affect funding costs in a host country, but potential costs in terms of instability in the face of host opportunity shocks. Of course, the overall impact of banking integration on volatility is an empirical question that depends on the predominance of each type of shocks. In applied work, an extra difficulty appears, which has to do with the fact that it is very difficult to identify and isolate the types of shocks discussed above. These caveats, coupled with data availability problems has lead research to include aggregate measures of foreign bank presence and evaluating its significance in a regression having the square of a macroeconomic variable (like investment, consumption or GDP) as the dependent variable (Morgan and Strahan, 2003) . If banking integration is not significant, this means that the stabilising and destabilising effects compensate each other.
The data
The analysis focuses on a sample of Latin American countries including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru, selected based on data availability. Information is quarterly and spans the period 1995:1 -2001:4, for which a balanced panel is available.
1 As a consequence, we have 28 quarters and 8 countries resulting in 224 observations. Banking information was kindly provided by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), while macroeconomic data are available from the IMF's International Financial Statistics and local sources (i.e., central banks and national institutes of statistics).
Banking data were built using balance sheets of local financial institutions that report to appropriate regulatory agencies, and consist of a measure of foreign and public bank presence, and concentration of the banking system. Each bank is classified according to its capital ownership in public and private, domestic, regional or foreign. Foreign Banks are those with more than 50% of the capital owned by a G10 country. Some of the countries in the sample also host banks from other Latin American countries (regional banks). As in Galindo et al. (2004) , we treat them here as domestic banks because the authors find that they behave mostly like domestic banks. We consider public banks to be those with most of the capital owned by the government. Using this classification, the measure of foreign and public bank presence is defined as their respective credit shares in the whole system. The measure of credit considered is direct credit by banks to private and public, non-financial institutions.
Finally, the degree of concentration in the system is captured by the share of credits by the three largest banks over the total stock of credit.
Macroeconomic data deemed relevant for the analysis consist of real credit by banking institutions to the private sector (the dependent variable), seasonally-adjusted real domestic GDP, seasonally-adjusted U.S. real GDP, the Federal Funds Rate, the domestic fiscal balance, the spread between lending and borrowing rates, the degree of financial development, the bilateral real exchange rate with the U.S., and measures of banking and currency crisis.
Quarterly real credit, the dependent variable, is computed as the nominal credit stock average over the months, deflated by the CPI. The Federal Funds Rate is expressed as percent per annum while the fiscal balance is computed as the four-quarter rolling-sum of the headline central government balance, over nominal GDP. The spread uses interest rates for local currency operations (in percent per annum), and is computed as the difference between the lending and borrowing rates, as a ratio of the borrowing rate. Financial development in the economy is expressed as the percentage of the stock of total (public plus private) credit over GDP. The bilateral real exchange rate with the U.S. was computed using market nominal exchange rates (in national currency per U.S. dollar) and seasonally-adjusted consumer price indices. Variables that include monetary units are measured in millions of local currency. Banking crisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for each quarter of the year in which there was a banking crisis. Systemic banking crisis for 93 countries over the period 1970-2000 are dated in Caprio et al. (2005) , while for 2001 we used information provided by Carstens et al. (2004) .
2 Finally, a proxy for a currency crisis was constructed based on Frankel and Rose (1996) . These authors define a currency crisis index which takes a value of one if a depreciation in a given quarter is higher than 10%, which is in turn at least five percentage points higher than the depreciation of the previous quarter.
As mentioned in the introduction, foreign banks have been very active in Latin America over the estimation sample, allowing to asses their impact on credit behaviour. The data shows that foreign direct investment (FDI) into the Latin American banking sector was mainly encouraged by the process of deregulation and privatisation of this industry that took place during the 1990s. As a result, the share of foreign banks on total credits more than doubled in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru between 1995 and 2001 (Figure 2). 3 This is against a slight increase in banking concentration over the region, with the exception of Brazil and Chile, where concentration has been reduced ( Figure 3) . Source: Author's calculations.
The econometric model
Our interest lies in identifying the impact of foreign bank presence on credit volatility, controlling for additional factors affecting the mean and conditional variance of credit. The ARCH family models are particularly suitable for this purpose since they allow estimating jointly the determinants of both the first and the second conditional moments of the data. Surprisingly, none of the studies on the subject made use of this methodology. The econometric model to be estimated consists of the following equations:
In the mean equation (1), yit is the dependent variable, µ i is an individual, countryspecific fixed effect, X it is a vector of explanatory variables, b 0 denotes the constant term, b 1 is a set of coefficients, uit is a disturbance term, and N and T are the number of cross-sectional units and time periods in the panel, respectively. In equation (3), the conditional variance, λ 0i is an individual, country-specific fixed effect while Z it is a vector of explanatory variables. 4 Together, equations (1)- (4) constitute a panel ARCH model, which is estimated by quasimaximum-likelihood techniques. 5 The vector of macroeconomic explanatory variables assumed to affect credit dynamics in equation (1) includes real domestic GDP, the U.S. GDP, the Federal Funds Rate, the domestic fiscal balance, the spread between lending and borrowing rates, the degree of financial development, the bilateral real exchange rate with the U.S., and a measure of currency crisis. The lagged dependent variable is introduced in the regression to control for persistence in the level of private credit.
We expect banking lending to be procyclical, both with respect to local and international economic activity. 6 A higher foreign GDP captures a more benign international context, then leading to higher credit in domestic markets. We also expect increases in the international cost of money, measured by the Federal Funds Rate, to lead to a less buoyant credit activity in domestic economies. In the same direction should play increases in the real exchange rate, since they can be considered as another component of international lending costs. When the real exchange rate depreciates, the repayment of foreign loans becomes more expensive, making them less attractive. This may be a potential important channel of credit contraction since the countries in the region have been extensively issuing foreign debt as a way of funding domestic lending operations.
With respect to the fiscal balance, the banking sector has proved to be a large provider of governmental funding in the countries under consideration. It would then be expected that better public account positions would crowd-in private credit. A higher interest rate spread should negatively affect credit, by making fewer projects become economically viable. A priori, we might expect currency crisis episodes in a particular country to be accompanied by a decline in banking lending, since they are associated with general losses of confidence in the system and a retrenching in deposits.
The banking variables assumed to enter the mean equation are the presence of public and foreign banks in the system, and the level of concentration. Much has been discussed on the impact of public banks on economic variables, such as financial deepening, and GDP and productivity growth (La Porta et al., 2000; Paniza, 2004 and Micco et al., 2006) . Here we extend the analysis to assess the impact of public banks on private credit dynamism for the eight countries under consideration.
Regarding foreign bank presence, empirical evidence is inconclusive up to the impact of foreign banks on credit dynamism. While Crystal et al. (2003) have found a positive effect, with foreign banks exhibiting a more robust loan growth than their national counterparts in a sample of Latin American countries over the second half of the 1990s, show that in poorer countries a stronger foreign bank presence is robustly associated with a slower credit growth to the private sector. 7 Finally, a more concentrated banking system is expected to reduce credit dynamism, because dominant players have much at stake in the event of negative shocks, then reducing risk taking behaviour (Morgan and Strahan, 2003) .
Both theory and evidence highlight the importance of including interaction terms in equation (1) to account for the potential asymmetric behaviour of public and foreign banks in the event of crisis and external and internal shocks. For example, Micco and Panizza (2004) find that state-owned banks may play a useful credit-smoothing role because their lending is less responsive to macroeconomic shocks than the lending of private banks.
Regarding foreign banks, the empirical literature gives conflicting results as to whether or not they exacerbate credit expansions and contractions. Some empirical studies analyzing cross border lending from international banks to developing countries show a positive relationship between the host country business cycles and international lending behaviour. Indeed, multinational banks may reduce lending to host countries which face economic difficulties to reallocate their capital over markets with better economic prospects (Dahl and Shrieves, 1999; Buch, 2000; Jenneau and Micu, 2002; Morgan and Strahan, 2003) . Against these studies, Micco and Panizza (2004) find that foreign banks have not contributed to exacerbating lending cyclicality in a sample of developing and developed countries over the period 1995-2002. However, studies on foreign banks behaviour during financial crisis in the host country point that internationally-diversified and more capitalized foreign banks did not reduce their credit supply in periods of financial distress, then contributing to a greater stability of credit. Foreign banks might view crises as an opportunity to expand their operations, then increasing their local market share. 8 As such, many studies focusing on foreign banks reactions to crisis in Latin America reach such a conclusion Peek and Rosengren, 2000a; Crystal et al., 2002; . de Haas and Van Lelyveld (2004) and Kraft (2002a) find similar results for eastern European countries, while Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1998) , Levine (1999) and Martinez Peria et al. (2002) find a similar conclusion studding cross-country experiences.
Foreign banks may also shape the way international interest rates and foreign GDP shocks affect lending behaviour. For example, in the event of a Federal Funds Rate increase, these institutions may exacerbate the "flight to quality" effect, helping amplifying the external shock. Regarding foreign GDP, the literature gives conflicting results on the impact on credit by foreign banks and cross border lending. On the one hand, authors like Moshiriam (2001 ), Martinez Peria et al. (2002 and De Haas et al. (2006) find a negative push relationship between the home country economic cycle and cross border lending and foreign bank lending in host countries. Parent banks can expand their activities in the host country when facing worsening economic conditions in their own market, as a way to seek for external lending opportunities and boost profits. On the other hand, Dahl and Shrieves (1999) and Rosengren (1997, 2000a ) find evidence of a positive push relationship between the home country economic cycle and cross border lending and foreign bank lending in host countries. The authors argue that this can be the case because economic turmoil in the home country can lead to deterioration in the parent's bank financial conditions, making them reduce foreign subsidiaries' activities. Empirical evidence for the region seems to go in this direction, since Goldberg (2002) observes that U.S. bank claims to Latin American countries increase as the U.S. economy grows.
As such, interaction terms between public/foreign banks, and banking/currency crises, and between foreign banks and the Federal Funds Rate and the American and domestic GDP will be included in the analysis.
Regarding the variables in the conditional variance equation (3), we included banking and currency crisis, the presence of foreign and public banks, financial development and the degree of concentration in the banking system. While we expect crisis to be positively related to credit volatility, the impact of foreign bank presence is uncertain.
As with foreign bank presence, banking concentration may either increase or reduce credit volatility. On one side, higher concentration levels may imply less competition and increased profits by large banks. The resulting increase in banking franchise values boosts their incentives to make good loans, thus avoiding investing in more speculative assets, and rendering the system more stable. On the other side, more powerful institutions have the ability to charge higher interest rates to their costumers, encouraging risk taking behaviour, and leading to greater vulnerabilities in the system (Boyd and de Nicolo, 2005) . Also, more concentrated banking systems are likely to induce moral hazard behaviour because concentrated banks are "too important to fail" (Mishkin, 1999) . All in all, risk taking behavior increases, which results in more vulnerable banks. Morgan and Strahan (2003) have already tested the impact of foreign bank entry, financial development and banking concentration on economic volatility, measured by the squared and absolute value deviation of actual from expected GDP and investment growth. For the full sample, they find tentative evidence of a positive link between foreign bank presence and economic volatility. Concentration is not statistically significative, and surprisingly, financial development is found to increase economic volatility, which is puzzling both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Nevertheless, when they focus only on a sample of Latin American countries, they obtain negative coefficients in the GDP regressions for both banking integration and financial development, although they are not statistically significant. Denizer et al. (2002) do find evidence that financial deepness helps reducing economic volatility, using a panel of 70 developed and developing countries starting in the mid-1950s. Indeed, they find that financial development reduces per capita consumption, investment and income volatility growth. In the same direction, by studying bank-specific data on lending behaviour by domestically-and foreign-owned banks in Argentina and Mexico, find that foreign banks generally have had higher loan growth rates than their domestically-owned counterparts, with lower volatility of lending, contributing to lower overall volatility of credit. Interaction terms between the crisis variables and foreign and public banks were also included in the variance equation to determine if these types of banks act as volatility absorbers or amplifiers.
Panel unit root tests
Financial sector foreign direct investment in Latin America is a relatively new phenomenon, putting a burden on data availability and invalidating the use of time series techniques applied to individual countries. The usage of panel data that pools together information for different cross-sectional units increases the amount of information and the power of econometric estimations. Nevertheless, the usual concerns about nonsense spurious regressions and misleading statistical inferences still arise when using potential non-stationary panels in which the time dimension exceds by far the number of cross-sectional units.
10 Indeed, checking the unit-root properties of the variables will be an ineluctable step in disentangling the effect that foreign banks may have on credit volatility in our sample of Latin American countries.
The number of tests to detect the presence of unit-roots in panels has been growing rapidly over the recent past. First generation techniques have been designed ignoring the possibility that unobserved common factors can affect the cross-section units simultaneously. This possibility can easily arise in macroeconomic applications that use country or regional data, substantially biasing the estimated coefficients and distorting the size of the test statistics. In particular, Pesaran (2006) shows that in the presence of high cross-sectional dependence, the bias is such that the empirical size is higher than the nominal size.
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Recognising this deficiency, a second group of panel tests have been proposed to successfully address this issue (see Breitung and Pesaran, 2005 , for a literature review). Nevertheless, the unwarranted application of these techniques does not go without difficulties. If panel unit root tests that allow for cross section dependence are used in cases where this is not sufficiently high, tests might result in a loss of power.
Therefore, before deriving any inference on the statistical properties of the data it is necessary to establish whether or not the panel is subject to a significant degree of error crosssection dependence. This can be achieved by conducting first generation panel unit root tests, obtaining the residuals of each equation, and then computing the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test suggested by Breusch and Pagan (1980) . The LM statistics tests the null hypothesis of zero cross-equation error correlations, and is based on the average of the squared pair-wise sample correlation of the residuals ( ,i j ρ ). 12 The test is given by:
under the null hypothesis of no cross section dependence it converges to a chi-squared distribution with N(N -1)/2 degrees of freedom. This test has been shown to be especially suitable for cases in which N is sufficiently small relative to T, as in our case.
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To test for unit roots assuming that the individual time series in the panel are crosssectionally independently distributed we have made used of Choi (2001) 
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and p i is the asymptotic p-value of the unit root test of cross section i. The null hypothesis is that all times series have a unit-root, while under the alternative hypothesis some of the variables are stationary. A main advantage is its improved finite sample power over other traditional techniques, like Levin and Lin (2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) .
The panel unit root test that allows for cross sectional dependence is constructed around the same lines as before, the only difference being the ADF regression used to obtain the p-values and the fact that the Z statistics does not converge any more to a standard normal distribution, even for large T and N. In such a case, stochastically simulated critical values have to be used instead.
14 Pesaran (2006) proposed an easy way to deal with the problem of cross sectional correlation arising from an unobserved common factor, which consists of simply augmenting the standard ADF regression with the cross section averages of lagged levels and first-differences of the individual series. In particular, the Z test will be constructed now using the OLS p-values associated to coefficient β i in the following 1 -2001:4 . Recognising that potential biases may arise when including different deterministic components in the estimating unit root equations, we have adopted the following strategy. Country-variables that do not exhibit a trend were centered, and no deterministics at all were included in the analysis, which allows for testing the null of a random walk without drift process against the alternative of the variable being level stationarity. When country-variables do exhibit a trend, models with constant and with and without a linear trend were estimated. Only if the null hypothesis is not rejected in both cases, then we can be confident that a unit root is present in the data. Indeed, column (1) indicates the cases in which some of the equations include a constant only, while column (2) presents those in which the same set of equations were extended to include a linear trend.
The test of cross section dependence performed on the residuals of the ADF estimations that do not contain averages of the dependent variable are reported in Column (4). May be not surprisingly, significant cross sectional dependence across countries was only 14 These depend on the simple size (T and N) and on the deterministic components included in the regressions. 15 The augmentation order p was selected on account of the Schwartz Information Criterion applied to each cross section ADF equation, without the cross section variables found in macroeconomic variables like real GDP, the fiscal balance, real private lending and real exchange rates. In contrast, most of the banking variables are free of common factors that may make them to be highly correlated. The last column of Table 1 16 For almost all the variables it is possible to reject the unit root null, while for real GDP the test gives conflicting results. Somewhat expectedly for trendy variables, the unit root null is not rejected when only a constant is included in the equation while it is rejected when a trend is also added. 17 Individual unit root tests results for the American real GDP and the Fed Funds Rate (not reported) do not allow rejecting the presence of a unit root in the series. Following these results variables were transformed accordingly. In particular, when the unit root was rejected and the variables are already expressed as shares (like foreign bank presence, concentration, etc.), the level difference with respect to the HP trend was considered. And when they were not, the percentage deviation with respect to the trend was used instead. Of course, when a unit root is present, the variables were differentiated. 18 Finally, in the case of the real GDP in which results were not conclusive, estimations will be carried out under both types of transformation of that variable, to ensure the robustness of the econometric results. of the standard normal distribution or the simulated critical vale, for the cases without and with cross section dependence. The optimal number of lags included in each cross section ADF equation was determined using the Schwarz information criterion (SIC).
Estimation results

The econometric methodology
This section presents the steps followed to estimate the model, selecting among a set of variables those significant at conventional statistical levels, while a more detailed analysis of the role played by interaction terms in the mean equation is presented in Annex I, following a particular to general strategy. To choose the final specification for the model, we preliminary identify the presence of fixed effects in the mean and variance equation, we test for poolability of the data (i.e., that coefficients in the mean equation are the same across countries), and we identify the presence of ARCH effects in the conditional covariance equation.
Indeed, we begin by estimating the mean equation by OLS and testing for the presence of fixed effects suing a Chow test, assuming that the data are poolable. In particular, we test for the null hypothesis that all the individual fixed dummy variables included in equation (1) 
where N and T are the cross and time series dimension respectively, K is the number of coefficients, excluding the dummy variables and the constant, RRSS is the residual sum of squares of the restricted model (i.e., the pooled OLS), and URSS is the residual sum of squares of the unrestricted model (i.e., the OLS model that includes the fixed effects dummy variables).
Once we have decided on the inclusion of fixed effects dummy variables, we proceeded to test for poolability of the data in the estimated equation. Again, this is performed using a Chow statistics to test the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are equal among the cross-sectional units. The statistic is defined as:
The RRSS is given by the OLS estimation performed on the pooled model (i.e., assuming homogenous coefficients), whereas the unrestricted residual sum of squares (URSS) is the sum of the residual squares performed on each separate country specific OLS regression (i.e., assuming a different coefficient for each country equation).
The next step consisted in using the residuals of the previously estimated mean equation to test for the presence of fixed effects in the conditional variance. In particular, we ran a regression of the form:
and tested for the joint significance of µ i using a Chow test, for a given value p. Once we have decided on the inclusion of fixed effects, we proceeded to test for the presence of ARCH effects (i.e., the significance of α j 's) in the conditional variance. The null hypothesis is then that no ARCH effects are present in the model. Finally, equations (1)- (4) were estimated jointly using maximum likelihood techniques, adopting different specifications (sets of explanatory variables) for the variance equation. To avoid potential endogeneity problems, lagged domestic variables are introduced in both the mean and variance equations as explanatory variables. Indeed, we measure the impact of previous values of the variables on subsequent credit behaviour. The exceptions are the currency and banking crisis dummies and the foreign variables (U.S. GDP and the Fed Funds Rate), which are included in contemporaneous form.
The determinants of credit behaviour: the mean equation
Model (1) in Table 2 presents the results for the most general estimation on the mean equation, while model (2) excludes the insignificant variables at conventional statistical levels. 19 In both estimations the null hypothesis of absence of fixed effects in the mean equation is not rejected, suggesting that fixed effects are not present in the data. The same results hold true for the null of poolability of the data, suggesting that coefficients are significantly equal across countries, justifying the standard homogeneity assumption. Models (3) to (10) present the same estimation as model (2), the only difference being the inclusion of explanatory variables in the variance equation (Table 3 ).
As reported in that Table, tests of fixed effects in the conditional variance do not allow rejecting the null hypothesis for both model (1) and (2). This is due to the dummy for Mexico which is highly significant, while the rest are not statistically different from zero. Absence of ARCH effects of order one is rejected at the 10% level, while absence of ARCH (4) effects is rejected even at the 1% level in model (2). All the models were estimated then including ARCH(1) effects in the conditional variance equation.
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Results for the mean equation show that the lagged dependent variable is highly significant, suggesting persistence in the level of credit. Persistence in credit behaviour has also been found by for a panel of 89 low income and lower middle income countries over the second half of the 1990s. Our estimations also point to a high degree of lending procyclicality, a finding that has already been found by Barajas and Steiner (2002) and Arena et al. (2007) for Latin American, and by de Haas et al. (2006) for central and eastern European countries, using quarterly bank level data during the 1990s. Results presented in Annex I also point that foreign banks do not contribute to amplify credit cycles in the region, given that the interaction between domestic GDP and foreign bank presence is not significant. This finding is consistent with Micco and Panizza (2004) who suggest that foreign banks are not statistically different from domestic private banks regarding cyclical lending behaviour.
As previously mentioned, push factors including the U.S. GDP and the Fed Funds Rate were included to account for the buoyancy of international financial markets. While having the expected signs, they were fund insignificant at standard statistical levels in the econometric estimations. This indicates that mainly pull factors played a role in shaping credit behaviour in the second half of the 1990s in the sample of Latin American countries. Interaction terms between these variables and foreign bank presence are neither significant, giving no credit to the hypothesis that foreign banks may exacerbate external shocks (Annex I).
Two pull variables which are not significant in the econometric estimation are the fiscal balance and the spread between the lending and borrowing rates. It was expected that healthier public finances would lead to a crowd-in effect, then boosting domestic loans. And higher intermediation costs would make loans more expensive, then reducing the stock of credit in the economy. As with the push variables, even when the coefficients have the expected signs, they are not significant at conventional statistical levels.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the lagged degree of financial development is also highly significant, pointing that more developed financial systems today help to foster real private credit in subsequent periods. As expected, the real exchange rate is also significant, showing that depreciations reduce credit in domestic economies, because it makes more expensive the repayment of loans in foreign currency. This finding is similar to that of Arena et al. (2007) for the same region.
Banking variables including foreign and public bank presence and the degree of concentration of the sector do not seem to have a role to play in affecting the level of loans granted by the system. As aforementioned, empirical evidence is inconclusive up to the impact of foreign banks on credit dynamism. While foreign banks seem to have been more active in the granting of loans than their domestic counterparts in Latin America over the second half of the 1990s (Crystal et al., 2003) , it seems that they restrict access to private commercial credit once attention is focused on low income and lower middle income countries . These authors also observe that the negative effect disappears once mid-and high-income countries are included in the sample, a finding which is consistent with the fact that a larger foreign bank presence is associated with more rather than less private credit in higher income economies. In contrast to our findings, the same authors find that state banks lead to a slowdown in credit growth, a finding that persists even after including wealthier countries in the estimation sample.
Both banking and currency crisis are expected to have a negative effect on credit behaviour. During banking crisis generally involving bank runs, deposits are depleted putting a burden on the granting of loans. Currency crisis may trigger balance sheet effects, leading the banking sector to experience bankruptcy problems. Only the currency crisis dummy was found to have the expected negative sign while banking crisis does not have statistically distinguishable effect on credit behaviour. 21 This might be due to the fact that crises tend to coincide with deterioration in economic fundamentals making their impact indistinguishable from other cyclical downturns. Regarding interaction terms, foreign banks do not seem to behave differently than national institutions, both in banking and currency crisis (Annex I). Nevertheless, government owned banks do seem to have a stabilizing role on credit during banking crisis. A similar result is reported by Micco and Panizza (2004) how state that publicowned banks may play a useful credit-smoothing role because their lending is less responsive to macroeconomic shocks than the lending of private banks.
The impact of foreign bank presence on credit volatility
As mentioned in the previous section, the estimation of the variance equations are presented in Table 3 , where different sets of explanatory variables susceptible of having a burden on credit volatility were included in the analysis. This is a main difference with previous works on the issue of disentangling the impact of foreign banks and financial development on macroeconomic volatility, since we modelled together the first and second conditional moments of the data instead of using two-step estimators which are known to be less efficient techniques. Indeed, in Models (1) and (2) of Table (3) we model variance behaviour only through an ARCH(1) process which proves to be significant at the 10% level.
Model (3) extends models (1) and (2) by including a dummy variable for banking crisis, which proves to be highly significant. Indeed, while periods of banking crisis do not seem to have a statistically significant effect on the level of credit, they are characterised by a heightened volatility of credit to the private sector. Next, we test in turn for a differential behaviour of foreign and public banks during financial stress periods, by including interaction terms between the dummies for banking crisis and foreign and public bank presence. If either one or the other type of institution exacerbates credit volatility, the coefficient should be positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. In the present case, there does not seem such differential behaviour. In the case of public banks, the conclusion seems to support the idea that they have a stabilizing effect during stress periods but only on the level of credit (i.e., the first moment of the data). While banking crisis increase credit volatility, this does not seem to be true for currency crisis, as shown by the insignificance of the coefficient of that dummy variable in the column for Model (6) .
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The revision of the theoretical literature presented at the beginning of the paper has shown that there is no definite answer to the question of whether or not foreign banks raise or reduce credit volatility. Everything depends on the types of shocks hitting the economy, which are in practice extremely difficult to isolate. That is why in empirical work only an aggregate measure of foreign bank presence is included in the estimations. If stabilizing effects predominate, then the coefficient should be negatively signed and statistically significant at conventional levels. The opposite is of course true when foreign banks increase credit volatility. As gauged by the empirical evidence presented in Table 3 , foreign banks do seem to have contributed to reduce real credit volatility in our sample of eight Latin American countries over the period 1995-2001. The coefficient for foreign banks under Model 7 in Table 3 is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.
Of course, it can be argued that foreign bank presence could just be capturing the degree of development of the financial sector, or a more concentrated banking system. Financial system foreign direct investment often consists on the buying and fusing of local banks. As mentioned before, theoretical literature abounds on how a deeper financial sector is expected to lead to a more stable macroeconomy. And regarding concentration, it was said that its impact on volatility is unknown a priori, since there are theoretical arguments that justify that more concentration may either increase or reduce the vulnerability of the system.
Evidence reported under Model 8 in Table 3 shows that deeper banking systems indeed result in lower credit volatility. This finding is coherent with Denizer et al. (2001) for other macroeconomic variables, and with Goldberg et al. (2000) , who find that foreign banks exhibit lower volatility of lending than their domestically-owned counterparts, contributing to lower overall volatility of credit. Note that due to the positive correlation between foreign bank presence and banking sector development, the coefficient for foreign bank penetration is slightly reduced in absolute terms, while remaining significant at conventional statistical levels. Including concentration among the explanatory variables in the conditional variance does not modify the previous findings, both in terms of sings and statistical significance, but shows that concentration has no role to play in shaping credit volatility patterns. This result is in line with Morgan and Strahan (2003) , who found that banking concentration does not affect GDP and investment growth volatility in a sample of Latin American countries over the period 1990-1997.
In a last specification, public banks were included in the econometric estimation, but proved not to be significant. Indeed, the final specification retained for the conditional variance equation is Model (8) in which banking crisis increase real credit volatility, while foreign bank entry and banking development reduce such volatility. The diagnostic tests performed on this and the other models show that we can be pretty confident about the specification of the econometric equations. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the standardised residuals are normal, as stated by equation (4) . 23 Also, we test for the correct specification of the mean and variance equations by testing for the presence of autocorrelation and conditional heteroscedasticity in the standardised residuals. Indeed, we never reject the hypothesis of absence of low and high orders of ARCH effects, and while autocorrelation of order four seems to be present in models (1) to (7), this disappears once financial development is included among the regressors of the conditional variance equation. 23 Using the notation for equations (1)- (4), these are computed as: 
Conclusion
Foreign bank entry into developing countries has exploded since the 1990s, favoured by the opening up of their foreign sectors and the embracement of a series of market-friendly policy reforms, including deregulation and privatization of the banking sector. One region that has been very active in attracting foreign direct investment into the banking industry has been Latin America. This unprecedented internationalisation of the banking sector has prompted a debate on the potential consequences for the recipient countries, in terms of the efficiency and diversification of the banking industry, the quality of the regulatory environment, and competition and access to banking services by small and medium size enterprises, among a broader set of topics studied by the literature.
Against this background, the present paper has investigated the impact of foreign bank presence on real credit volatility in a panel of eight Latin American countries using quarterly data over the period 1995: 1-2001:4. We have tried to disentangle the effect of foreign banks on credit volatility by using ARCH techniques to model jointly the first and second conditional moments of real domestic credit. Indeed, the conditional volatility equation is extended to include the degree of development of the banking sector and the internationalization of the banking system among the regressors. To the knowledge of the authors, this is the first time that such tools are used to analyse the impact of foreign bank presence on macroeconomic volatility.
The theoretical literature examining the link between foreign direct investment in the banking sector and macroeconomic stability is rather limited and does not give a clear answer to this issue. Everything depends on the type of shocks hitting the economy, and indeed, the overall impact of banking integration on volatility is then an empirical question. But apart from the theoretical arguments, there are other potential explanations of why foreign banks may contribute to credit stability. Foreign banks are typically well diversified institutions with access to a broader set of liquidity sources than domestic banks. They may also allow for a faster recapitalisation of local banks after a crisis, and they may have superior risk management systems and better screening devices, then improving the quality of their assets. Finally, they have the potential of avoiding capital flight in the case of domestic shocks, since individuals may prefer to redirect deposits towards foreign owned institutions instead of taking the money out of the system altogether. This contributes to higher funding and lending stability.
The main findings of the paper regarding credit volatility are as follows. First and perhaps not surprisingly, banking crisis steeped-up real credit volatility, with public and foreign banks having no discernible effect (positive or negative) during these stressful periods. Second, evidence reported in this paper shows that deeper banking systems result in lower credit volatility, a finding that is coherent with Denizer et al. (2001) for volatility in other macroeconomic variables, such as consumption, investment and real GDP. Finally, stabilising affects predominate in such a way that foreign bank presence reduced credit volatility in our panel of eight Latin American countries over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . This is in line with Goldberg et al. (2000) , who find that foreign banks exhibit lower volatility of lending than their domestically-owned counterparts, contributing to lower overall volatility of credit.
ANNEX I
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF INTERACTION TERMS ON CREDIT DYNAMICS
This Annex presents a particular to general econometric analysis to evaluate the importance of interaction terms in shaping the dynamics of the level of real credit (mean equation). Estimation results of applying this procedure to the panel of eight Latin American countries are presented in Tables A.1 and A. 2. For each model we test for the presence of fixed effects in the mean and variance equation, we test for poolability of the data (i.e., that coefficients in the mean equation are the same across countries), and we identify the presence of ARCH effects in the conditional covariance equation. Empirical evidence shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of absence of fixed effects and poolability of the data in the mean equations for all the estimated models. And while we can reject the null of absence of fixed effects in the conditional variance equation, this is due to the high significance of the dummy for Mexico. When a dummy for this country was introduced in the variance equation the estimated algorithm did not reach convergence. Indeed, it was decided to exclude such dummy variable. Moreover, as we cannot reject the presence of ARCH effects, the conditional variance will be modelled following allowing for an autoregressive heteroscedastic process of order one. Estimations are then performed using quasi maximum-likelihood techniques. Variables are introduced one by one in the mean equation and kept in the next round of estimations only when they are significant. This allows to keep the number of regressors restricted which of highly importance to guarantee convergence of the estimating algorithm.
The most parsimonious model that we estimate includes only an autoregressive term (Model 1). As it proved to be highly significant, it was kept in the subsequent estimations. Note that while this term always keeps a high degree of significance throughout all the models, the absolute value of the coefficient is reduced as we start including extra explanatory variables. This is due to the fact that other regressors start capturing part of the credit dynamics that was before completely imputed to the autoregressive term.
The next model includes domestic GDP to capture procyclicality in credit behaviour. This variable also proved to be highly significant and positively signed across all the estimated models. Strong evidence of credit procyclicality in the region has also been found by Arena et al. (2007) using annual bank level data for Latin America over the period 1980 -2000 we test for the impact that foreign bank presence may have in amplifying or reducing procyclicality in lending behaviour. If the hypothesis that international banking institutions exacerbate procyclicality is not rejected, then an interaction term between domestic GDP and foreign bank presence should be positively signed and statistically significant at conventional levels. Empirical evidence presented in Table A .1 shows that foreign banks cannot be blamed of having amplified credit cycles in the region, a finding that is in line with that of Micco and Panizza (2004) and Arena et al. (2007) .
In Models (4)- (7) we include external or push factors that may have a burden on domestic lending patterns. In particular, we include the U.S. GDP and the Fed Funds Rate, as well as their interactions with foreign banks, to test the hypothesis that these institutions amplify foreign shocks. It is found that, while the U.S. GDP has a positive impact on credit, neither the Fed Funds Rate nor the interaction terms are statistically significant. The finding of a positive coefficient for the American GDP is consistent with Goldberg (2002) who observes that U.S. bank claims to Latin American countries increase as the U.S. economy grows. It should be noted however, that while the U.S. GDP is kept in the estimations because it is significant in this round, it will loose its explanatory power in subsequent models.
Next, we include the fiscal balance, the spread between the lending and deposit rate, the degree of financial development, and the bilateral real exchange rate with the U.S. From this set of variables, only the last two appear to be significant and were consequently kept in subsequent estimations. As noted in the main text, lagged degrees of financial development help boosting real private credit in the future. Also, increases in the real exchange rate (i.e. depreciations) have a negative impact on the level of credit, since they make more expensive the repayment of loans in foreign currency. Similar results for the region were found by Arena et al. (2007) .
In Models (12) to (14) of Table A .2 we added banking variables to the econometric regressions: public and foreign bank presence, and the concentration of the banking system. None of these proved to be significant. Empirical evidence to date is inconclusive up to the impact of foreign banks on credit dynamism. Our results coincide with those of who found that foreign banks have no discernible effect on the level of credit granted by the system, once their sample of countries is expanded to include mid-and highincome countries.
The next six models (15 to 20) include the occurrence of banking and currency crisis and their interactions with foreign and public banks. While having the expected negative sign, the banking crisis dummy is not statistically significant. As explained in the text, this may be due to the fact that the impact of crises might be captured by movements in other macroeconomic variables. Concerning the interaction with foreign and public banks, only the last one is positive and statistically significant. This means that public banks help stabilising credit levels during banking crisis periods. In contrast to banking crisis, including a currency crisis dummy among the regressors gives a negative and statistically significant coefficient, while foreign and public banks do not seem to exacerbate or buffer the impact of such events on credit behaviour. 
